





The Role of the U.S. Securities
and Exchange Commission in
Transnational Acquisitions**
Introduction
The Williams Act amendments to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,1
the principal law regulating tender offers and other corporate acquisitions,
makes no distinctions based upon whether the bidder is domestic or for-
eign. Accordingly, the Securities and Exchange Commission, as a matter
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and Ms. Gresham and Ms. Sullivan are Attorneys, Office of General Counsel, United States
Securities and Exchange Commission.
As a matter of policy, the Securities and Exchange Commission disclaims responsibility
for any private publication or statement of any of its employees. The views expressed herein
do not necessarily represent the views of the Commission or its staff. See 17 C.F.R.
§ 200.735-4(e) (1987).
**An earlier version of this article was delivered at the ABA Program on International
Mergers and Acquisitions on June 4-5, 1987. Portions of this article have been or may be
utilized in other connections.
The Editorial Reviewer for this article is Jean Van den Eynde.
I. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, §§ 13(d)-(e), 14(d)-(f), Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat.
454 (1968) (amended 1970) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e), 78n(d)-(f) (1982). Section
13(d) of the Exchange Act imposes reporting requirements for substantial acquisitions of
equity securities. Section 13(e) is an antifraud provision that applies to tender offers by an
issuer for its own securities. Section 14(d) requires any person making a tender offer for
another company's securities to file information with the Commission and affords share-
holders certain substantive protections. Section 14(e) is an antifraud provision relating to
tender offers. Section 14(f) requires that information equivalent to that required by the
proxy provisions be sent to shareholders if a majority of the board of directors is to be
elected or designated other than at a shareholders' meeting.
Sections 13(f) and (g) of the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78n(f), (g) (1982),
which require further disclosures of beneficial ownership, were added subsequently.
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of policy, strives to achieve evenhandedness in assuring that the require-
ments of the Williams Act, and the regulations adopted pursuant to it,
are satisfied by domestic and foreign bidders alike. Nonetheless, unique
considerations necessarily arise when either bidder or target have signif-
icant contacts with a foreign nation.
Until recently, the use of tender offers as an acquisition technique was
largely concentrated in the United States. This scarcity of transnational
tender offers may be attributable to the fact that many foreign countries
did not encourage tender offers, either by law or by trading practices. 2
One result of the internationalization of the securities market, however,
has been a general blurring of the distinctions between trading practices
in many nations. For example, even before the recent headline-grabbing
revelations of insider trading connected to tender offers in the U.K., the
acquisition of United Distillers by Guinness in the United Kingdom-a
hostile takeover marked by aggressive tactics on both sides-was a sig-
nificant change in the norms of takeover practice in that country. More
recently, British Petroleum has announced a tender offer for the shares
of Britoil in the face of U.K. Government opposition, again, a shift away
from previous practices.
It is apparent that the tender offer, which for many years has been an
important method for acquiring publicly held corporations within the United
States, is becoming an increasingly important technique in international
acquisitions as well. In fiscal year 1986, for example, twenty-one tender
offers subject to the Commission's rules (including seven bids that were
not approved by the target's directors) were filed by foreign bidders for
the securities of U.S. corporations.
As a result of these and other changes in world markets, the role of
the Securities and Exchange Commission in enforcing the federal secu-
rities laws, including the Williams Act, has become more complex. Ques-
tions have arisen concerning both the Commission's regulatory and
enforcement responsibilities. This article briefly reviews: the basic re-
quirements of the Williams Act as they have been implemented by the
Commission; the basic jurisdictional premises for the international appli-
cation of the securities laws; certain special issues relating to transnational
acquisitions implemented through tender offers; and issues relating to
enforcement proceedings that involve international aspects of tender of-
fers, especially enforcement of the prohibition against insider trading.
2. For example, in Switzerland, any kind of a takeover, particularly a hostile tender
offer, would be difficult to consummate because the board of a publicly held company
generally must approve the sale of registered shares.
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I. Williams Act Requirements
Pursuant to section 13(d) of the Exchange Act, any person or group
acquiring the beneficial ownership of more than 5 percent of a class of
equity securities registered under the Act must disclose those holdings
on a Schedule 13D filed with the Commission within ten days of the
acquisition.3 The form must include information about the person ac-
quiring the securities, including residency and citizenship, as well as its
plans and proposals for the company. 4
Concurrently with making a tender offer that would result in ownership
of more than 5 percent of a class of registered equity securities, the person
or group making the offer must file a Schedule 14D-1 with the Commis-
sion. 5 Substantially all of the information required by Schedule 14D-I
must also be disseminated to the shareholders of the target company,
which must on request either provide the offeror with its shareholder list
or distribute the materials itself.6 Finally, within ten days of dissemination
of information about the offer, the target company must disseminate to
its shareholders a statement disclosing whether it recommends accep-
3. See Rules 13f-l, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13f-I (1987), and 13d-102, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-102
(1987), inter alia, which also require disclosure of holdings.
4. Requirements concerning the disclosure of citizenship and residency were added by
Congress in 1977. Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 (1977).
5. Rule 14d-3, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-3 (1987). The Schedule 14D-1 must also be delivered
to the target company, any other bidder that has filed a Schedule 14D-1 relating to the same
class of securities, and each national securities exchange upon which the target class of
securities is listed. Disclosure under Schedule 14D- covers the following matters:
" Information about the offer, including expiration date, offering price, withdrawal rights,
proration.
" Trading history of the security.
" Information about the offeror and its officers, directors, partners, and controlling per-
sons, including employment histories and involvement in violations of securities laws.
* Past contracts, transactions, and negotiations with the target.
" Source and amount of funds or other consideration used in the offer.
" Purpose of the offer and plans of the offeror after acquiring securities to effect ex-
traordinary corporate transactions.
" Holdings of the offeror and its principals in that company; transactions in the target
company's securities in last sixty days.
* Terms of any contracts, understandings, or relationships with respect to the target's
securities.
* Persons the offeror has retained to assist in the offer.
" In the case of an exchange offer, financial information about the offeror.
Section 13(e) of the Securities Exchange Act prohibits an issuer from purchasing its
equity securities in contravention of rules adopted by the Commission to define acts and
practices that are fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative or to prescribe means reasonably
designed to prevent such action. Rule 13e-4 provides specific guidelines for issuer tender
offers.
6. Rule 14d-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-5 (1987).
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tance, recommends rejection, is taking a neutral position, or is unable to
take a position. 7
The Williams Act and accompanying rules and regulations of the Com-
mission provide a number of important substantive protections to the
shareholders of target corporations. Commission rules require that a tender
offer remain open for a minimum of twenty business days from the time
it commences. 8 There is, however, no specified time by which it must be
completed. The offer must extend at least ten business days beyond any
announcement of a change in tender price or change in the number of
securities to be acquired. 9 Any other material change in the terms or
conditions of the offer may likewise require the bidder to extend the
offer. 10
Tender offers also must be made to all holders of the class of securities
subject to the offer. II The consideration paid to any shareholder pursuant
to an offer must be the same as the highest consideration paid to any
other shareholder during the offer. 12 Commission rules also provide that
any person who has deposited securities pursuant to a tender offer has
the right to withdraw any such securities during the period the offer re-
mains open.' 3 Tendered securities that have not been accepted for pay-
ment may be withdrawn sixty days following commencement of the offer. 14
Section 14(e) prohibits fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative acts in
connection with a tender offer and gives the Commission authority to
define and prescribe means to prevent such practices. Pursuant to this
authority, the Commission has established a "disclose or abstain from
trading" provision, which prohibits communicating or trading while in
possession of certain material nonpublic information, if any person has
taken substantial steps toward commencing a tender offer.' 5
Other provisions of the securities laws are also applicable to tender
offers. For example, in addition to the general prohibition on fraud con-
tained in provisions of rule 10b-5,16 rule lOb-1317 prohibits purchases of
subject company securities by the bidder other than pursuant to its tender
offer; rule 10b-618 regulates purchases by the bidder of the securities it
7. Rule 14e-2, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-2 (1987).
8. Rule 14e-l(a), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-l(a) (1987).
9. Rule 14e-I(b), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-1(b) (1987).
10. Rule 14d-4(c), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-4(c) (1987); see 52 Fed. Reg. 11458 (April 9, 1987).
II. Rule 14d-10, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-10 (1987).
12. Rule 14d-10(a)(2), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-10(a)(2) (1987).
13. Rule 14d-7(a), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-7(a) (1987).
14. Section 14(d)(5), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(5) (1982).
15. Rule 14e-3, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3 (1987).
16. 17 C.F.R. § 240.1Ob-5 (1987).
17. 17 C.F.R. § 240. 1Ob-13 (1987).
18. 17 C.F.R. § 240.1Ob-16 (1987).
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offers in an exchange offer; and rule l0b-419 prohibits short tendering in
connection with any tender offer.
II. Application of the U.S. Securities Laws
to Transnational Tender Offers
A. JURISDICTIONAL ISSUES
Although relatively few U.S. cases have involved transnational tender
offers, general principles concerning the application of the federal secu-
rities laws to transactions involving foreign entities and securities offer
guidance. 20 Courts use a "conduct" test (jurisdiction predicated on con-
duct occurring within the United States), or an "effects" test (jurisdiction
predicated on acts causing significant and foreseeable effects within the
United States) in determining whether the securities laws have extrater-
ritorial application. Generally, United States jurisdiction is more likely to
be applied in a case that involves enforcement of the antifraud sections
of the securities laws than in a case that involves provisions requiring
registration of persons or securities. 21 Thus, a tender offer that involves
some conduct in the United States, but gives no indication of the existence
of fraudulent conduct, is less likely to be subjected to the requirements
of the federal securities laws. 22 The second limitation is that the conduct
in the United States must be significant, and not "merely preparatory." 23
19. 17 C.F.R. § 240. 1Ob-4 (1987).
20. As early as 1964, the Commission recognized that it would be inappropriate to apply
the regulatory framework of the federal securities laws in all situations they could arguably
reach. In Securities Act Release No. 4708, 29 Fed. Reg. 9828 (July 9, 1964), the Commission
stated that "the registration requirements of Section 5 of the [Securities] Act are primarily
intended to protect American investors." Thus, even when the federal securities laws may
be triggered by the use of "jurisdictional means" (i.e., the offer or sale ofa security involving
interstate commerce or use of the mails), the Commission observed that it would not exercise
its jurisdiction with respect to a distribution that " is to be effected in a manner which will
result in the securities coming to rest abroad." The regulatory framework for internatioral
application of the Williams Act requirements, which are also designed primarily for domestic
use, should likewise be understood in the context of this release. For example, the Com-
mission's recent "all-holders" release, discussed infra at section IV.A., acknowledges that
tender offers for the securities of foreign issuers with U.S. secondary markets or U.S.
security holders could avoid the application of U.S. law by tailoring the terms of the offer
to exclude U.S. interests.
21. lIT v. Cornfeld, 619 F.2d 909, 921 (2d Cir. 1980); accord Plessey Co. v. General Elec.
Co., 628 F. Supp. 477, 494 (D. Del. 1986).
22. See Note, The Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Securities Laws in the Absence of
Fraud Charges, 18 LAW POL'Y INT'L Bus. 649, 655--64 (1986).
23. Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 987 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
1018 (1975). These two limitations are illustrated in Continental Grain (Australia) Pty. Ltd.
v. Pacific Oilseeds, Inc., 592 F.2d 409 (8th Cir. 1979), in which the court determined that
the communication of American defendants with Australian plaintiffs involved a failure to
disclose material information. The court concluded that the activities at issue in the case
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United States jurisdiction has been applied, however, where conduct
occurs overseas and the impact of the conduct in the United States is
sufficient to warrant the exercise of jurisdiction. Thus, the Second Circuit
exercised its jurisdiction under the federal securities laws in a suit alleging
that dilution of the minority position in a Canadian corporation by means
of transactions on the Toronto Stock Exchange based upon material un-
disclosed information resulted in a lowering of the Canadian corporation's
stock prices in the United States securities market. 24 In another case,
Des Brisas v. Goldfield Corp.,25 the court exercised jurisdiction when the
purchase by an American corporation of all of a Canadian corporation's
assets, including its stock, effected in Canada was alleged to have caused
the collapse of the American market in the American company's shares. 26
B. APPLICATION OF THE WILLIAMS ACT
TO TRANSNATIONAL TENDER OFFERS
Questions concerning the application of the Williams Act to transna-
tional tender offers could arise in a number of possible scenarios. For
example, a foreign entity could be attempting to take over a U.S. cor-
poration with shares traded on a U.S. exchange and registered with the
Commission. The provisions of the Williams Act would clearly apply to
such an acquisition.
Conversely, when a U.S. person or group makes a tender offer for the
shares of a foreign corporation that are not registered with the Commission
nor held or traded in the United States, the disclosure provisions of the
Williams Act generally would not apply.27 Nevertheless, the antifraud
provisions of section 14(e), as well as other antifraud provisions of the
entailed fraud, which heightened the interest of the United States in the activities. Fur-
thermore, the court found that the activities had not been merely preparatory. Instead, the
fraud had been "conceived in and directed from the United States" and then exported to
Australia. Id. at 412.
The recent decision of Zoelsch v Arthur Andersen & Co., 824 F.2d 27, 30-31 (D.C. Cir.
1987), draws a distinction without a difference in these "conduct" cases by suggesting that
they can be separated into "restrictive" and "permissive" analyses. In fact, all the securities
decisions premised on the conduct test cited in Zoelsch state that they concern conduct
"essential to the plan to defraud," SEC v. Kasser, 548 F.2d 109, 1115 (3d Cir. 1977) (emphasis
added) (Zoelsch cites Kasser as a "permissive" case, 824 F.2d at 31).
24. Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200, rev'd on other grounds, 405 F.2d 215 (2d
Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969).
25. 549 F.2d 133 (9th Cir. 1977).
26. The case law applying the conduct and effects test to securities claims is addressed
in RESTATEMENT (REVISED) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 416 (Tent. Final Draft July 15, 1985). Although that section does not deal adequately with
a factual pattern such as that in Schoenbaum, it otherwise draws from the law regarding
subject matter jurisdiction in securities cases.
27. Of course, depending on the circumstances, the offeror could be subject to numerous
other requirements of the securities laws, including other disclosure provisions.
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securities laws, could reach such a transaction if the jurisdictional tests
discussed above were met. 28
Finally, when a foreign entity is engaging in a takeover of another foreign
company, the application of the Williams Act will depend on the extent
to which that conduct takes place in, or affects, the United States and
U.S. investors. In general, when the number of United States holders of
the foreign corporation's securities is not substantial, a foreign bidder can
avoid the application of the federal securities laws by minimizing conduct
in the United States concerning the offer.29 A foreign bidder could, for
example, not mail information about the offer into the United States, not
accept any securities tendered from within the United States, and use
depository and transfer agents located outside the United States. 30
The application of the Williams Act in this last situation was considered
recently by a U.S. court in Plessey Co. PLC v. General Electric Co. PLC,3n
28. Cf. Des Brisas v. Goldfield Corp., 549 F.2d 133 (9th Cir. 1977).
29. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has held that there is "no reason to
extend jurisdiction to cases where United States activities . . . are relatively small in com-
parison to those abroad." lIT v. Cornfeld, 619 F.2d at 920 (citing Bersch v. Drexel Firestone,
Inc., 519 F.2d at 987).
30. Foreign bidders conducting tender offers for the shares of foreign corporations that
have U.S. shareholders often prefer to give foreign shareholders a choice of receiving either
cash or securities of the bidder. To avoid filing a Securities Act registration statement in the
United States, however, such bidders often restrict U.S. shareholders to receiving only
cash. In such situations, the question has arisen whether the offer to U.S. shareholders,
even though limited to cash, constitutes an "offer to sell" securities within the meaning of
Securities Act of 1933, §§ 2(3), 5, 15 U.S.C. H§ 77b(3), 77e (1982). The Commission's staff
has taken the position that this does not constitute an "offer to sell" as long as full and
conspicuous disclosure is made that the securities are not being offered to U.S. shareholders
and adequate safeguards are implemented to assure that no U.S. shareholder receives any
of the securities. Letter re Alberta Energy Co. Ltd. (Aug. 30, 1982); Letter re Jamaica
National Investment Co. Ltd. (Nov. 29, 1979). See generally Letter re United Technologies
Corp., [1978 Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 81,679. Similarly, when an American
company is required by foreign law to make a foreign tender offer for purposes of reorga-
nization, that tender offer has not been considered an "offer to sell" under §§ 2(3) and 5
of the Securities Act. Letter re White Shield Exploration Corp., [1970-1971 Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 78,079.
Because of the laws of other countries, this solution may not always be workable. The
staff has also issued no-action letters relating to the use of "vendor placings," which are
often employed in acquisitions of British companies. In that situation, the offeror issues its
own securities to the shareholders of the acquired company, called "the vendors," in return
for their shares. At the same time, the vendors renounce their right to the acquiror's shares
in favor of the acquiror, which sells the shares on behalf of the vendors and remits the
money to them. The shares are sold in such a manner that they "come to rest" outside
the United States. The staff has taken the position that the shares issued by the acquiror
to the vendors do not have to be registered pursuant to the Securities Act in light of the
fact that the shareholders of the company being acquired (i.e., the vendors) receive only
cash and are not entitled to retain the acquiror's shares. See, e.g., Letter re Electrocom-
ponents PLC (Sept. 23, 1982); see also Letter re Cambior, Inc. (June 22, 1987); Letter re
Oldcastle, Inc. (July 3, 1986).
31. 628 F. Supp. 477 (D. Del. 1986).
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which clarified the applicability of section 14(d) of the Exchange Act to
tender offers by bidders who are not citizens or residents of the United
States and who do not use the U.S. mails or interstate commerce. That
case involved a tender offer by one British company for the securities of
another British company. The subject company had three types of se-
curities, only one of which was registered in the United States. Plessey
American Depositary Receipts (ADRs) were registered for trading on the
New York Stock Exchange, and Dollar Ordinary shares and Sterling Or-
dinary shares were not registered for trading on the Exchange. Both the
ADRs and the Dollar Ordinary shares were convertible into Sterling Or-
dinary shares. The offer by GEC for Plessey shares was limited to the
Sterling Ordinary shares; the entire ADR holding represented only 1.6
percent of Plessey's outstanding shares.
GEC expressly limited its offer to exclude American offerees. 32 In order
to accomplish that objective, the offer was directed solely to Sterling
Ordinary shares, and it contained a statement that the offer was not to
be made or circulated in the United States. GEC stated that it would not
accept any tender that appeared to have come from the United States, or
on behalf of a United States person. GEC also required that an offering
shareholder disavow any connection to the United States and provide a
daytime telephone number outside the United States where the share-
holder could be contacted in the event of an inquiry. Finally, GEC stated
in its offer that if a United States person were to succeed in accepting
the offer, such a person would be ineligible to receive securities under
the offer, but would be limited to a cash alternative. GEC also attempted
to limit its public disclosure to the United Kingdom, and requested that
information regarding its tender offer not be disseminated in the United
States.
Inevitably, some information regarding the tender offer did circulate in
the United States, prompting certain inquiries of GEC and Plessey. None-
theless, the record before the court indicated that no conversions of United
States securities had occurred during the period of the tender offer that
would enable a United States person to tender Sterling Ordinary shares,
and no inquiries had been received from anyone in the United States
asking to participate in the tender offer.
Plessey, the target company, initiated a suit in the federal district court
of Delaware alleging that the registration and disclosure requirements of
the federal securities laws were applicable to GEC's activities and that
32. The opinion is silent as to the amount of American interests in either Dollar Ordinary
or Sterling Ordinary shares. Note, supra note 22, observes that the 7.2 million outstanding
ADRs had a market value around $30 million because they traded in the twenty-dollar range
during the offering period. Id. at 657, 663 n.68.
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GEC had failed to comply with those provisions. In its decision, the court
acknowledged that certain facts in the record would justify the exercise
of United States jurisdiction. Nonetheless, the court concluded: "[W]here
the only acts within the United States are secondhand news accounts not
directly attributable to the bidder, the American contact which would
justify an exercise of jurisdiction is relatively small and counsels against
its use." 33
Plessey illustrates a current dilemma in transnational tender offers:
whether it is necessary for a foreign entity contemplating a tender offer
for shares outside the United States to exclude American journalists from
press conferences, press release distribution lists, and access to company
spokesmen in order to avoid the application of the Williams Act. 34 Al-
though the Commission has not made an official pronouncement on this
issue, the Commission's staff has indicated that the Commission's rules
do not require such a restriction on American journalists' access to in-
formation. Such a restriction would not have the practical effect of pre-
venting the flow of information concerning a tender offer into the United
States, but instead could distort the publication of information. Of course,
distribution should not be targeted to the U.S. press. 35
At the February 1987 Roundtable on Internationalization held by the
Commission, several commentators addressed the effect of the Plessey
decision. In particular, institutional investors were disturbed by the fact
that, even if they held large positions in foreign issuers, they could be
unilaterally excluded from a tender offer as a result of the Plessey decision
and the Commission's endorsement of that decision in its "all holders"
release. 36 The Commission's Division of Corporation Finance is currently
studying the unfairness of excluding American institutional investors from
tender offers by foreign issuers. 37
33. 628 F. Supp. at 495. The entire offer was ultimately withdrawn for reasons based on
U.K. Law. After the issuance of the U.S. opinion, the U.K. Secretary of Trade and Industry
referred the GEC tender offer to the U.K.'s Monopolies and Mergers Commission, which
ultimately barred a merger between Plessey and GEC. See supra note 22, at 660.
34. Similar exclusions apparently are practiced in order to avoid the possible application
of U.S. registration requirements and "gun-jumping" rules.
35. Address by E. Walter, Deputy Director, Division of Corporation Finance, Securities
and Exchange Commission, "Accessing the U.S. Equities Market" (Dec. 8, 1986).
36. In its REPORT TO THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON BANKING, HOUSING AND URBAN
AFFAIRS AND THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE ON THE INTERNA-
TIONALIZATION OF THE SECURITIES MARKETS 111-326 (July 27, 1987) [hereinafter SEC
STAFF REPORT], the Commission's staff reported that it was considering proposing an
exemptive rule under section 3(b) of the Securities Act that would allow rights offerings,
and possibly exchange offerings, of less than $5 million for nonregistered securities.
37. See SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note 36, ch. V, app. B, at 25; see also Securities Act
Rel. No. 6653, 51 Fed. Reg. 25,873 (July 17, 1986), discussed infra at text accompanying
note 46.
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1I!. Special Issues Relating to Transnational Tender Offers
Assuming that a tender offer is subject to the provisions of the Williams
Act, a number of issues arise that are of particular importance to foreign
bidders.
A. DISCLOSURE OF FINANCIAL INFORMATION
One of the most difficult areas for a foreign bidder relates to the nature
and extent of financial information that bidders are required to disclose.
The financial statement requirements for bidders are set forth in Item 9
of Schedule 14D-1, which requires financial statements if the bidder's
"financial condition is material to a decision by a security holder whether
to sell, tender or hold" 38 the security sought in the tender offer. The
financial condition of a bidder is considered "material" to a shareholder
if the bidder does not otherwise file publicly available financial information
and is seeking a majority or other controlling interest of a subject
company. 39
In Life Investors, Inc. v. AGO Holding, N. V.40 a Netherlands corpo-
ration sought 15 percent of the outstanding stock of an American insurance
company. In holding that the bidder's financial statements were material,
the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit focused on the fact that the
tender offer, although limited to approximately 15 percent of the outstand-
ing stock, was an amount sufficient to allow the acquiror to exercise
control, even though the offer created a minority class of shareholders
retaining 40 percent of the company. The court also noted that the foreign
bidder was not otherwise subject to U.S. disclosure obligations.
Assuming the financial condition of the foreign bidder is deemed ma-
terial, "adequate" financial information concerning the bidder 4' must be
disclosed in the schedule. Additionally, pursuant to rule 14d-6(e)(viii), the
offering circular disseminated to shareholders must contain either the
financial disclosure required by the item or a fair and adequate summary
of that information.
To provide guidance to bidders as to what constitutes current adequate
financial information, Instruction I of Item 9 sets forth the type of financial
38. 17 C.F.R. § 240. 14d-1 (1985).
39. See Prudent Real Estate Trust v. Johncamp Realty, Inc., 599 F.2d 1140 (2d Cir. 1979);
Corenco Corp. v. Schiavone & Sons, Inc., 362 F. Supp. 939, 948-50 (S.D.N.Y.), a(ff'd in
part, 488 F.2d 207 (2d Cir. 1973).
40. [1981-1982 Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 98,356.
41. If the bidder is controlled by another entity that is not a natural person and has been
formed by the parent for the purpose of making the tender offer, current adequate financial
information concerning such parent would be required by Item 9 of the Schedule.
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information that would be deemed adequate for the purposes of the item.
The "safe harbor" provided by Instruction I is premised on the nature
of the bidder. For foreign bidders, financial statements prepared in com-
pliance with Item 17 of Form 20-F, if the bidder would be eligible to use
the form, are sufficient. 42 For the purpose of limiting the possible burdens
on bidders who are not subject to the periodic reporting requirements of
the Exchange Act, Instruction 3 to the item permits the use of unaudited
financial statements if audited statements are not available or obtainable
without unreasonable cost or expense. If a bidder relies upon this instruc-
tion, it must include a statement to that effect and disclose the reasons
therefor in its response to Item 9.
Not only must foreign financial information be presented in response
to Item 9 of the schedule, but that information must be presented in a
manner that is meaningful to the U.S. security holder, so that an informed
investment decision can be made. Accordingly, the Commission's staff
has taken the position that disclosure of a bidder's financial information
is deemed not responsive to the requirement unless that information is
accompanied by appropriate disclosure of the bidder's accounting prac-
tices, together with the identification, and, if practicable, quantification,
of any material variation in those accounting practices from U.S. generally
accepted accounting principles and the form and content of Regulation
S-X.
B. DISCLOSURE OF FOREIGN REGULATORY
REQUIREMENTS AND CONTROLLING PERSONS
Another issue of special concern for the foreign bidder relates to foreign
law. Item 10(b) of Schedule 14D-1 requires, where material and to the
extent known by the bidder after reasonable investigation, disclosure of
any "regulatory requirements which must be complied with or approvals
which must be obtained in connection with the tender offer." In addition
to securing approval from certain U.S. regulatory agencies, a foreign
bidder might also be subject to regulatory controls in its home country.
This could include the obtaining of consents under foreign exchange and
currency control regulations. 43 Moreover, certain foreign jurisdictions
may place restrictions on the manner in which a company controls a
42. Form 20-F is available for the registration of the securities of foreign private issuers
and for their annual reports. Item 17 requires financial statements that are substantially
similar to those prepared according to U.S. generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP),
i.e., that are prepared in accordance with U.S. GAAP, or are reconciled to U.S. GAAP.
43. See generally D. AYLING, THE INTERNATIONALISATION OF STOCK MARKETS 32-37
(1986).
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foreign entity.44 Such restrictions must be adequately disclosed. Conflicts
also arise when foreign law forbids the disclosure of certain information
required to be disclosed pursuant to Schedule 14D-1 and disseminated to
shareholders in accordance with rule 14d-6(e)(vii).
Item 2 of Schedule 14D-1 calls for, inter alia, the identity of the offeror
and its place of organization and principal business. This information must
also be given with respect to each person controlling the offeror. This
requirement can raise special problems for the foreign corporation, since
identification of the controlling persons of a foreign bidder may be ob-
scured by holding companies or by the existence of bearer shares. 45
IV. Recent Developments
A. APPLICATION OF "ALL-HOLDERS" RULE TO FOREIGN BIDDERS
A recent Commission regulatory change relating to tender offers is the
adoption of the "all-holders" rule. 46 The release accompanying the rule
explains that a tender offer must be extended to all security holders who
own shares of the class of security subject to the offer.47
The "all-holders" release specifically discusses the application of the
rule to foreign tender offers. As proposed, the amendments to the tender
offer rules would have included a provision specifying that the "all-
holders" requirement would not affect a tender offer in which the bidder
was not a citizen or resident of the United States and did not use the
mails or any means or instrumentalities of interstate commerce or any
facility of a national securities exchange. The Commission's purpose in
including this provision was to make it clear that the "all-holders" re-
quirement was not intended to cause a tender offer not otherwise subject
to the requirements of sections 13(e) or 14(d) of the Exchange Act, to
become subject to those requirements. In the meantime, however, the
United States District Court for the District of Delaware handed down
its opinion in Plessey.4 8 The Commission stated in its subsequent "all-
holders" release that it concurred with that opinion, and therefore con-
sidered it unnecessary to address foreign tender offers separately, beyond
44. See General Am. Host Corp. v. Triumph Am., Inc., 359 F. Supp. 749, 758 (S.D.N.Y.
1973):
Foreign controls, particularly when they differ in extent and kind from controls the
U.S. investor has come to expect from the U.S. government in relation to domestic
operations, are matters which should be called to the attention of shareholders in a
tender offer.
45. See Ronson Corp. v. Liquifin Aktiengesellschaft, 483 F.2d 846 (2d Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 870 (1974) (upholding grant of preliminary injunction).
46. Securities Act Rel. No. 6653, 51 Fed. Reg. 25,873 (July 17, 1986).
47. Rules 14d-10 and 13e-4(f), 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.14d-10, 240.13e-4(f) (1985).
48. Plessey Co. v. General Elec. Co., 628 F. Supp. 477 (D. Del. 1986).
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reiterating its position that "the all-holders requirement is not intended
to affect tender offers not otherwise subject to the Williams Act. . ....
B. APPLICATION OF FOREIGN LAW TO U.S. OFFERS
As discussed above, tender offers are becoming more common in mar-
kets outside of the United States, and other nations have adopted regu-
latory schemes to define the practices that would be acceptable within
their boundaries. Frequently, these regulatory schemes will differ signif-
icantly from the requirements of the Williams Act.
For example, in 1987 McDermott International, Inc. sought a decla-
ration from the National Securities Commission of Panama that Pana-
manian law was applicable to purchases of McDermott's Softwares by
Valhi, Inc. 4 9 Panama's law provides that it is illegal to purchase more than
5 percent of the shares of a Panamanian corporation registered with the
National Securities Commission until certain procedures have been fol-
lowed. These include submission of the offer to purchase together with
other disclosures to the corporation's board of directors and the potential
for a shareholder vote or a hearing before the National Securities Com-
mission on the adequacy of the disclosure.
Valhi argued that Panamanian law did not apply since its purchases of
McDermott were all made outside Panama from non-Panamanians. (Both
companies' shares are traded on the New York Stock Exchange.) Valhi
also contended that, although McDermott is registered in Panama, its
contacts with that country are minimal. McDermott argued in response
that it is a Panamanian corporation, registered with that country's National
Securities Commission, with employees and assets there, and that Panama
may legitimately regulate its internal affairs, even if this action has an
impact on shareholders located outside Panama.
On May 8, 1987, the National Securities Commission of Panama issued
a Resolution finding that McDermott was covered by Panamanian law.50
The Commission declared invalid as in violation of that law stock transfers
by means of which the Valhi group acquired more than two million
McDermott shares. The Commission further declared invalid any stock
transfers by means of which the group intended to acquire additional
49. At the same time that McDermott International sought to be declared subject to
Panamanian law regarding tender offers, U.S. shareholders asked the Delaware courts to
exercise jurisdiction over the company because its predecessor had been organized under
the laws of Delaware. The Delaware Supreme Court declined to exercise jurisdiction, citing
Delaware conflicts law, as well as the commerce clause and due process requirements of
the fifth and fourteenth amendments to the U.S. Constitution. McDermott, Inc. v. Lewis,
531 A.2d 206 (Del. 1987).
50. La Comisi6n Nacional de Valores, Resoluci6n No. 286 (May 8, 1987).
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shares of McDermott, unless those transfers were made in compliance
with the procedures established by Panamanian law.
Other nations also have requirements that are different from, and ar-
guably inconsistent with, the Williams Act. To the extent that conflicts
are present, participants in a transnational tender offer may be presented
with difficult and complex problems in fulfilling their responsibilities under
two or more regulatory schemes.
An analogous question was recently addressed by the Supreme Court
in CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America.51 The Court upheld the
constitutionality of an Indiana law providing that whenever any person
acquires more than 20 percent, 33/3 percent, or 50 percent of the out-
standing shares of certain corporations chartered in Indiana, those shares
lose their voting rights. The law further provides that these rights may
only be restored by a process involving two shareholder votes, including
one in which the majority of the shares held by "disinterested" share-
holders-i.e., excluding the acquiror, corporate officers, and inside di-
rectors-are cast in favor of restoring voting rights. The Court found that
the statute does not conflict with the provisions or purposes of the Wil-
liams Act and thus does not violate the Supremacy Clause. 52
Of course, the Supremacy Clause does not apply to the laws of sovereign
nations. Nevertheless, in determining which law controls in situations
where arguably the law of more than one nation applies, questions of
conflict and national interest will be important. 53
C. CONGRESSIONAL ACTIVITY
5 4
1. General Tender Offer Reform
A number of bills were introduced in the 100th Congress that would
make significant changes in the implementation of the Williams Act. 55
51. 107 S. Ct. 1637 (1987).
52. See Fleet Aerospace v. Holderman, 107 S. Ct. 1949 (1987), vacating and remanding,
796 F.2d 135 (6th Cir. 1986) (vacating and remanding a Sixth Circuit decision declaring a
similar Ohio statute, which prohibited actual purchase of shares without shareholder ap-
proval, unconstitutional in light of CTS).
In CTS the Court also found that the Indiana statute did not violate the Commerce Clause.
First, the Court found that the law did not discriminate against interstate commerce
(a) because it did not regulate interstate transactions or out-of-state bidders differently from
intrastate transactions or domestic bidders, and (b) because it did not create an impermissible
risk of inconsistent regulation by different states since it applied only to corporations char-
tered in Indiana. Second, the Court held that the limited effects of the Indiana law on
interstate commerce were justified by the state's interests in protecting the corporations it
charters and the shareholders of those corporations.
53. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (REVISED) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 403 (Tent. Final Draft July 15, 1985).
54. This article was prepared in April 1988. Thus, the article does not discuss the ultimate
disposition of the legislation discussed herein beyond that date.
55. S. 1323, 100th Cong., Ist Sess., 133 CONG. REC. S7666 (1987); H.R. 2172, 100th
Cong., Ist Sess., 133 CONG. REC. H2540 (1987); S. 1264, 100th Cong., Ist Sess., 133 CONG.
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S. 1323, the Tender Offer Disclosure and Fairness Act of 1987, would
amend section 13(d) in several respects. Among other things, it would
reduce the period required to file an initial Schedule 13D from ten to five
days, and would prohibit the acquisition of additional securities of the
same class once the filing threshold has been passed, until a Schedule
13D has been filed and a public announcement has been made and filed.
S. 1323 also would make certain amendments to section 14(d), including
an extension of the minimum offering period for tender offers to thirty-
five business days in most cases, and a requirement (with certain excep-
tions) that acquisitions leading to ownership greater than 25 percent of a
class of an issuer's securities be made by tender offer.
Additional provisions of S. 1323 would define and require the registra-
tion of "tender offer arbitrageurs"; require that amendments to section
16(a) reports be made within five days; authorize the Commission to obtain
civil penalties for violations of sections 13(d), 13(f), 13(g), 14, and 16(a);
create a private right of action for recovery of greenmail profits; and
increase criminal penalties for insider trading. On December 17, 1987, the
Senate Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs Committee reported out
S. 1323. In ordering S. 1323 reported, the Committee specifically rejected
a statutory requirement for one share/one vote, a statutory preemption
of state takeover laws, and prohibitions of golden parachutes and poison
pills. The bill does include provisions requiring studies of one-share/one
vote, the role of state law, proxy voting procedures and leveraged buy-
outs.
Another significant bill, H.R. 2172, designated the "Tender Offer Re-
form Act of 1987," was introduced on April 27, 1987, by Representatives
Dingell and Markey, of the House Energy and Commerce Committee. It
would require bidders to make a tender offer whenever they seek to
acquire more than 10 percent of a target company's stock. The House
bill would also require a simplified, summary disclosure statement about
key conditions of a tender offer. The bill would require tender offers to
remain open for a period of at least sixty calendar days, in contrast to
the current twenty-business-day requirement. Section 13(d) would be
amended to require notification within twenty-four hours when a bidder
acquires more than 5 percent of a company's stock, in contrast to the
present ten-day notification requirement. The 5 percent acquirer would
be precluded from purchasing additional stock of the same class for two
business days after passing the 5 percent threshold. Other provisions of
REC. 57073 (1987); S. 1420, 100th Cong., Ist Sess., 133 CONG. REC. S8631 (1987); H.R. 3,
100th Cong., Ist Sess., 133 CONG. REC. HI01 (1987). A related group of pending proposals
would lengthen the mandatory waiting periods for antitrust review of cash tender offers
under the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act. These bills, S. 432 and H.R. 586, had not, as of the date
of preparation of this article, been subject to congressional vote.
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the bill are designed to restrict such practices as "greenmail," "ware-
housing" or "parking" of securities, and "sweeping the street."
The Commission has generally supported legislation to reduce the
Schedule 13D initial filing period, but opposed legislation designed to
lower the Schedule 13D filing threshold. The Commission also supported
legislation to impose a standstill against further acquisitions until the
requisite Schedule 13D filing is made. The Commission testified that the
present minimum offering period for tender offers is adequate, and op-
posed legislation to extend it. The Commission also opposed legislation
to apply the tender offer requirements to all acquisitions exceeding a
specified percentage of an issuer's outstanding securities on the grounds
that the proposal was overbroad and that "market sweep" problems could
be addressed through Commission rulemaking. The Commission testified
in opposition to measures intended to restrict the use of greenmail, golden
parachutes, and poison pills, matters traditionally the subject of state law;
however, the Commission suggested that greenmail could be addressed
at the federal level through disclosure. 56
A comprehensive discussion of H.R. 2172 and the many other bills that
have been introduced in the 100th Congress is beyond the scope of this
article. There appears to be nothing in these general tender offer measures,
however, that would introduce a distinction between foreign takeovers of
U.S. companies and domestic takeovers.
2. "Hostile Foreign Takeover Moratorium Act"
One bill introduced in the 100th Congress, however, would introduce
such a distinction. S. 1264, the "Hostile Foreign Takeover Moratorium
Act," which was introduced in the Senate by Senator Terry Sanford on
May 21, 1987, would impose a six-month moratorium on hostile tender
offers by foreign entities if the consideration offered is to be financed by
debt. 57 The Commission has not commented formally on this bill. It should
be noted, however, that unlike the Williams Act and the other tender offer
reform bills pending before this Congress, the proposed Hostile Foreign
Takeover Act would, at least temporarily, introduce a distinction between
the treatment of domestic and foreign bidders. The Commission has not
previously supported such barriers to international capital flows. 58
56. See Statement of David S. Ruder, Chairman of the SEC, before the Subcommittee
on Telecommunications and Finance of the House Committee on Energy and Commerce
(Sept. 17, 1987).
57. See supra note 55, 133 CONG. REC. S7073 (1987).
58. H.R. 3 and S. 1420, supra note 55, were combined at conference into the Omnibus
Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, which passed the House of Representatives on
April 21, 1988. 134 CONG. REC. H2278-2376 (1988). As of the date of this writing, the bill
had been passed by the Senate, 134 CONG. REC. S4832 (daily ed. April 27, 1988), and the
President had stated that he would veto the bill.
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V. Insider Trader Enforcement and
Transnational Tender Offers
A. THE EFFECT OF BANKING AND BUSINESS SECRECY
LAWS ON COMMISSION ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITIES
In an era of increasing internationalization of the world's securities
markets and stepped-up activity in transnational tender offers, the inves-
tigation of possible violations of U.S. law relating to tender offers in-
volving non-U.S. participants in the U.S. securities markets has become
increasingly complex. In particular, laws in certain foreign countries that
prevent disclosure of customer-identifying information, and others that
restrict the disclosure of "commercial information," remain an impedi-
ment to effective enforcement of this country's securities laws. Thus,
when questionable trading activities suggesting inside information about
a tender offer have occurred in the United States, but the law of another
country prevents disclosure of the trader's identity, the Commission con-
tinues to encounter difficulty in making a preliminary inquiry into the
circumstances of the trading involved to determine whether a violation
of the U.S. securities laws has occurred.
Foreign secrecy laws have also been put forth to seek to prevent dis-
closure of the identity of a customer who has traded in U.S. markets in
cases when such information has been sought through formal process,
such as a subpoena, as part of a Commission investigation or in a U.S.
court proceeding. While the Commission has made substantial progress
in dealing with foreign secrecy laws in the last several years through
judicial means and bilateral agreements, the enforcement problems that
accompany the overall internationalization of the world's securities mar-
kets and increasing activity in transnational tender offers will remain a
major focus of the Commission's efforts in the next several years.
Following is a discussion of two of the most significant cases litigated
by the Commission involving foreign secrecy laws and the special diffi-
culties those cases entailed, a recent Supreme Court decision regarding
foreign secrecy laws, and a summary of the Commission's efforts to achieve
The original versions of this bill, particularly an amendment offered to H.R. 3 by Rep-
resentative Bryant, would have mandated disclosure by the Commerce Department of for-
eign ownership of controlling interests in U.S. businesses, and also dealt with the registration
of that information. These provisions were dropped, and are not reflected in the legislation
currently under consideration. The Commission had taken no position on that legislation,
but, when asked, SEC Commissioner Joseph A. Grundfest pointed out that the ownership
reporting requirements already in the federal securities laws uniformly require the disclosure
of information by all major investors, domestic or foreign, in publicly held companies.
Statement of Joseph A. Grundfest, Commissioner of the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission, before the Subcommittee on Telecommunications, Consumer Protection, and
Finance of the House Committee on Energy and Commerce (May 8, 1986).
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agreements through bilateral negotiations with other countries to pierce
secrecy laws. 59
B. RECENT COMMISSION EFFORTS TO PIERCE THE
SHIELD OF SECRECY LAWS THROUGH JUDICIAL MEANS
1. SEC v. Tome 60
The "St. Joe case" began in 1981 as an effort to learn a customer's iden-
tity. The case was initiated because of inherently suspect activity: pur-
chases of call option contracts for the stock of St. Joe Minerals Corp. (St.
Joe) by unknown purchasers, through a Swiss bank, the day before the
announcement by Joseph E. Seagram & Co. of a proposed tender offer for
all the outstanding shares of St. Joe at $45 per share, a $14 premium.
The Commission initially sought and was granted a temporary restrain-
ing order freezing the profits derived from the transactions. The action
for the temporary restraining order named as defendants Banca della
Svizzera Italiana (BSI), the Swiss bank through which some of the initial
questionable orders had been placed, and Irving Trust Company, a U.S.
bank in which BSI deposited the proceeds of its trades. Since the identity
of the purchasers was not known at that time, the complaint charged them
as "certain purchasers."
The Commission served interrogatories upon the known defendants in
an effort to learn the identities of their customers. BSI, however, refused
to respond to the interrogatories or to reveal its customers' identities.
The Commission then moved for an order to compel discovery and also
sought contempt sanctions against BSI (including a $50,000 per day fine
and an order that BSI cease and desist from any further trading in the
U.S. securities markets) in the event that BSI failed to comply with the
court's order. BSI defended this action by claiming that such disclosure
would violate Swiss secrecy laws and subject it to civil and criminal
liability in Switzerland. The court, however, rejected BSI's claims, granted
the Commission's motion, and ordered BSI to disclose its customers'
identities. 6' BSI then disclosed the identities of several of its customers,
59. The following portion of the article is derived in part from an outline prepared by
Gary Lynch, Director of the Division of Enforcement, and Rochelle Souza, an attorney in
the Division of Enforcement, entitled "Recent SEC Enforcement Developments" (SEC
Enforcement Institute, 1987).
60. 638 F. Supp. 596 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), aff'd, 833 F.2d 1086 (2d Cir. 1987), petition for
cert. filed sub noma. Lombardfin S.p.A. v. SEC, 56 U.S.L.W. 3571 (U.S. Feb. 8, 1988) (No.
87-1321) and Transatlantic Fin. Co., S.A. v. SEC, 56 U.S.L.W. 3592 (U.S. Feb. 16, 1988)
(No. 87-1368).
61. For a general discussion of the appellate decision, see Goelzer, Riesenberg & Sullivan,
International Markets Hampering Enforcement, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 7, 1987.
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in particular a broker named Giuseppi Tome and three Panamanian cor-
porations through which he traded. The Commission subsequently learned
through testimony obtained in a letter rogatory proceeding in Italy in 1985
that Tome's former business associate Paolo Mario Leati and his company,
Lombardfin, S.p.A., were also implicated in the illegal St. Joe trades.
On June 3, 1986, Tome, the three Panamanian companies he controlled,
Leati, and Lombardfin were found by the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of New York to have engaged in illegal insider trading
and ordered to disgorge approximately $3.5 million in illegal profits, plus
interest. The Second Circuit affirmed the decision of the district court,
rejecting appellants' contentions that they had not received due process
because they were served by publication in Europe rather than in person.
The court observed that appellants had received actual notice of the
Commission's action, and that they had deliberately sought to conceal
their identities behind foreign secrecy laws. 6 2 Lombardfin, Leati, and the
three Panamanian companies have now petitioned the Supreme Court for
certiorari.
During the pendency of these proceedings, the Swiss Government froze
the Swiss bank accounts of certain purchasers of the common stock and
call options for the common stock of St. Joe at the time of the tender
offer. The Commission's request to the Swiss Government for information
regarding the identities of these remaining purchasers was subsequently
granted.
2. SEC v. Certain Unknown Purchasers of Common Stock63
On October 5, 1981, Santa Fe International Corp. (Santa Fe) and Kuwait
Petroleum Corp. (KPC) announced that, upon approval of KPC's share-
holders, Santa Fe would be merged into a subsidiary of KPC. The share-
holders were offered $51 per share for the Santa Fe common stock, which
was then trading in the low $20s. Just before the announcement, certain
unknown purchasers bought 3,000 call options in the stock of Santa Fe
and 27,000 shares of Santa Fe common stock. All of the unknown pur-
chasers' transactions were effected through Swiss bank accounts. Most
of the options contracts of the unknown purchasers were sold within a
two-week period following the announcement of the Santa Fe merger.
On October 26, 1981, the Commission sued the unknown purchasers,
one named individual, and certain Swiss banks for insider trading viola-
tions. The Commission was granted a temporary restraining order freezing
the proceeds of the defendants' transactions. Upon the entry of the tem-
62. SEC v. Banca della Svizzera Italiana, 92 F.R.D. I II (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
63. Civ. No. 81-6553 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), aff'd, 817 F.2d 1018 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied,
56 U.S.L.W. 3568 (U.S. Feb. 23, 1988).
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porary restraining order, the court ordered service upon the Swiss bank
defendants, and ordered the banks to transmit the summons and complaint
to the unknown purchasers. The Commission also sought and was granted
an order directing alternative service on the unknown purchasers by pub-
lication, since it had been unable to learn their identities. On November
13, 1981, upon the Commission's motion, the court granted a preliminary
injunction freezing the profits of the unknown purchasers pending a trial
on the merits. Upon entry of the preliminary injunction, the Commission,
through interrogatories, sought to learn the unknown purchasers' iden-
tities from the Swiss banks through which they had purchased their stock
and options. The banks, however, refused to answer on the ground that
to do so would violate Swiss bank secrecy laws.
The Commission subsequently engaged in consultations with officials
of the Swiss Government. On March 22, 1982, based upon those initial
consultations, and the belief that the requirements of the Treaty between
the U.S. and Switzerland on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters
64
were met by the violations alleged by the Commission in its complaint,
a request for assistance was formally submitted to the Swiss Government.
The unknown purchasers used all legal means available in Switzerland
to frustrate the Commission's request. On January 26, 1983, the Swiss
Federal Tribunal initially denied the Commission's request. 65 The Com-
mission then alleged additional facts in support of its request for assistance
under the Mutual Assistance Treaty, and on May 16, 1984, the Swiss
Federal Tribunal granted the Commission's request, 66 and the Commis-
sion learned the identities of the unknown purchasers.
In the meantime, on July 27, 1983, the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of New York granted the Commission's request for the
issuance of letters rogatory to obtain "relevant" evidence in England and
64. See infra notes 72-73 and accompanying text.
65. The opinion of the Swiss Federal Tribunal denying the Commission's request stated
that tipping information regarding the Santa Fe merger as well as trading on the basis of a
tip would violate Swiss law. However, the Tribunal stated that under Swiss law, a person
who is aware of the information that he is supposed to keep secret and then uses it to his
advantage without revealing it to a third party may not be guilty of violation of a business
secret, since the secret has not been revealed. Thus, an insider who merely traded without
tipping would not violate Swiss law. The Tribunal concluded that, while the trading in the
Santa Fe case might have violated Swiss law, because the Commission had been unable to
allege whether the traders were insiders or tippees, it could not make the requisite deter-
mination that the defendants had in fact violated Swiss law. Judgment of Jan. 26, 1983,
Tribunal fddral, 109 Arr~ts du Tribunal fedral suisse, Recueil officiel [ATF] lb at 47 (1983),
summarized at 22 I.L.M. 785 (1983).
66. Judgment of May 16, 1984, Tribunal Federal, reproduced in 28 ETUDES SuIssEs DE
DROIT EUROPtEN 316 (1984).
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France pursuant to the Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence 67
regarding certain purchases in call options for the common stock of Santa
Fe. The letters rogatory to England sought the testimony of two former
employees of a London-based bank incorporated in Luxembourg that had
placed orders for Santa Fe securities on behalf of one or more of its
customers during the relevant time period.
Despite the bankers' objections in the U.K. courts that the information
sought in their testimony was not relevant and that its disclosure would
violate Luxembourg and British bank secrecy laws, the bankers were
compelled to testify. Affidavits submitted by the Commission in the matter
showed the likelihood that their testimony would disclose relevant infor-
mation. In addition, the affidavits showed that there was no proven like-
lihood that the bankers would be prosecuted under the Luxembourg bank
secrecy statute, and that British bank secrecy laws would not apply be-
cause, based on the facts of the case, such an application of the secrecy
laws would not be in the public interest. 68
By 1986, more than four years after the Commission brought its initial
action against the "unknown purchasers," they had been identified. On
February 26, 1986, they were ordered to pay $7.8 million, including dis-
gorgement of illegal trading profits and prejudgment interest. All defen-
dants consented to injunctions enjoining them from violating section 10(b)
of the Exchange Act and rule lOb-5 thereunder.
C. INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS FOR OBTAINING ASSISTANCE
IN DISCOVERY OF SECURITIES LAWS VIOLATORS
The first major effort the United States undertook to establish inter-
national norms for obtaining evidence abroad was its approval of The
Hague Convention on Taking Evidence Abroad in Civil and Commercial
Matters. 69 The Convention provides procedures for civil and commercial
litigants to obtain evidence from abroad. Because the Commission's in-
sider trading suits seek to obtain disgorgement for individual trades, for-
eign courts have recognized the Commission's standing to obtain evidence
under the Convention. 70 However, the Convention's limitations-in es-
sence, it is only available for pretrial discovery of testimony relevant to
67. See infra notes 69-71 and accompanying text.
68. The letters rogatory to France, although successful on certain procedural points (see
infra note 70), had not produced evidence before the termination of the Commission's suit
in the United States.
69. Opened for signature March 18, 1970, 23 U.S.T. 2555.
70. See, e.g., In reTestimony ofConstandi Nasset, Trib. Admin. de Paris, sixi~me section-
deuxi~me chambre, No. 51546/6 (Dec. 17, 1985).
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trial-do not commend it to Commission discovery at trial or during an
investigation. 7 1
I. Treaties
The United States has entered into a number of mutual assistance trea-
ties that were expressly designed to be available for Commission securities
investigations.
a. Treaty between the U.S. and Switzerland
on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters
In 1977 the United States entered into a treaty with Switzerland that
provides for broad assistance in the exchange of information in criminal
matters. 72 The Treaty provides for assistance in cases where the alleged
violations would violate the criminal laws of both countries and may be
used in aid of administrative inquiries. Its compulsory process is available
to the Commission because the U.S. securities laws provide for criminal
penalties; the Swiss Government can agree to its use for both civil court
proceedings and ancillary administrative proceedings. The Commission
thus may make use of its provisions during investigations into conduct
that might constitute a criminal offense under the U.S. securities laws.
Nonetheless, the Commission's experience with the Treaty has been
limited because until recently no exact prohibition of insider trading was
contained in the Swiss Penal Code. This is so despite the fact that, as
discussed above, 73 Swiss courts have construed Swiss law to prohibit
disclosure of inside information and profiting from such stolen informa-
tion. Thus, in 1982, in SEC v. Certain Unknown Purchasers,74 the Com-
mission succeeded in learning the identities of account holders who had
directed purchases of stock and stock options through Swiss banks just
before the announcement of the merger between Santa Fe and the Kuwait
Petroleum Corporation. 75
71. The Supreme Court recently ruled that, in considering whether a litigant should have
recourse to the Hague Convention procedures in obtaining discovery against another litigant,
a court should review a variety of relevant factors, including the degree of difficulty these
limitations-and other obstacles more particular to the suit at hand-would present to the
successful completion of discovery. In any case, the Court held, the Convention does not
obligate United States courts to require first resort to its procedures before allowing alter-
native methods of discovery against parties. Socidtd Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v.
United States Dist. Ct., 107 S. Ct. 2542 (1987).
72. Treaty on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, May 25, 1973, United States-
Switzerland, 27 U.S.T. 2019, T.I.A.S. No. 8302 (entered into force Jan. 23, 1977).
73. See supra note 65.
74. See supra notes 64-66 and accompanying text.
75. As discussed more fully in the text accompanying notes 88-90 infra, the Commission
will soon be able to rely completely upon the treaty for insider trading inquiries because Swiss
law now expressly prohibits such conduct, and the Swiss Government has agreed to use of
treaty provisions in connection with civil and administrative inquiries into insider trading.
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b. Treaties with Canada and the Cayman Islands
on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters
On March 18, 1985, the United States and Canada signed a treaty that
provides mutual assistance in criminal matters, specifically including se-
curities matters. 76 On July 3, 1986, the U.S. and the Cayman Islands
signed a treaty on mutual assistance that also expressly provides assis-
tance in matters relating to insider trading and securities fraud. 77 The
schedule of covered offenses in these treaties includes a definition of fraud
similar to that of rule l0b-5 under the Securities Exchange Act. The
Commission believes that, upon ratification, it will be able to use both
agreements to obtain evidence from these countries.
c. Other Mutual Assistance Agreements
The United States also has agreements with the Kingdom of the Neth-
erlands, with Turkey, and with Italy. These agreements are drafted in a
broad manner that would allow their use in the investigation of securities
violations. 78
2. Memoranda of Understanding
The Commission in recent years has also entered into various agree-
ments with securities regulators in foreign countries in order to enhance
its ability to obtain evidence in connection with securities law enforcement
actions. Following are descriptions of these agreements.
a. Memorandum of Understanding between the
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
and the United Kingdom Department
of Trade and Industry
76. United States-Canada Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters (pend-
ing Canadian ratification).
77. Treaty Concerning the Cayman Islands and Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal
Matters, July 3, 1986, United Kingdom-United States, 26 I.L.M. 536 (1987).
78. Treaty with the Republic of Turkey for Extradition and Mutual Assistance in Criminal
Matters, June 7, 1979, United States-Turkey, 32 U.S.T. 3111, T.I.A.S. No. 9891 (entered
into force Jan. I, 1981); Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance with the Kingdom of the
Netherlands, June 12, 1981, United States-Netherlands, T.I.A.S. No. 10734 (entered into
force Sept. 15, 1983); Treaty between the United States and the Italian Republic on Mutual
Assistance in Criminal Matters, signed in Rome, Nov. 9, 1982 (entered into force Nov. 13,
1985), 24 I.L.M. 1539 (1985).
Similar broad language, which would allow their use for securities law investigations, is
contained in two other mutual assistance treaties that the United States has negotiated and
signed, but that are pending ratification by the foreign signatories. See Mutual Legal As-
sistance Treaty with the Republic of Colombia, signed in Washington, Aug. 20, 1980 (pending
Colombian ratification); Mutual Legal Assistance Convention with the Kingdom of Morocco,
signed in Rabat Oct. 10, 1983 (pending Moroccan ratification).
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On September 23, 1986, the SEC and the Commodity Futures Trading
Commission (CFTC) signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU)
with the United Kingdom Department of Trade and Industry (DTI). 79 The
DTI is the SEC's counterpart for regulation of the national securities
markets in the United Kingdom.
The MOU establishes the first working arrangement between securities
regulators in this country and the United Kingdom. The MOU provides
the SEC and the DTI with assistance, on a reciprocal basis, in obtaining
records that are in the hands of the other regulator or that can be obtained
from private sources through voluntary cooperation. It is an interim ar-
rangement that both parties view as a first step in their efforts to establish
a comprehensive understanding to provide bilateral cooperation relating
to securities regulation.
The MOU is available for use both in investigations and for regular
market oversight. Specifically, the MOU makes assistance available to
the SEC in matters involving insider trading, market manipulation, and
misrepresentations relating to market transactions, as well as in efforts
relating to the oversight of the operation and financial qualifications of
investment businesses and brokerage firms. The MOU will provide the
CFTC with similar assistance.
The MOU provides special safeguards to ensure that assistance is not
abused by either party. Requests must be made with particularity. When
questions arise as to the MOU's operation, consultations between the
parties are mandated by the agreement. Finally, at the conclusion of the
matter in question, and to the extent permitted by law, all documents not
previously made public will be returned to the other authority.
Once information is received pursuant to the MOU, it can be used by
the Commission staff during the investigative process or in litigation. It
also can be used by criminal or state authorities in furtherance of a general
charge (i.e., mail and wire fraud) related to an underlying securities law
violation.
b. Memorandum between the U.S. Securities and
ExchangeCommission and the Securities Bureau
of the Japanese Ministry of Finance
On May 23, 1986, the Commission signed a Memorandum with the
Securities Bureau of the Japanese Ministry of Finance concerning the
exchange of information relating to securities regulation and enforce-
79. Memorandum of Understanding on Exchange of Information between the United
States Securities and Exchange Commission and the United Kingdom Department of Trade
and Industry in Matters Relating to Securities and between the United States Commodity
Futures Trading Commission and the United Kingdom Department of Trade and Industry
in Matters Relating to Futures (Sept. 26, 1986); see 25 I.L.M. 1431 (1986).
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ment. 80 In that Memorandum the two agencies "agree[d] to facilitate each
agency's respective requests for surveillance and investigatory informa-
tion on a case-by-case basis." 81 The Memorandum appoints a special
contact person in each agency to enhance regular communication and
processing of requests.
c. Memorandum of Understanding between the U.S. Securities
Exchange Commission and the Ontario Securities
Commission, Quebec Securities Commission
and the British Columbia Securities Commission
On January 7, 1988, the Commission entered into a Memorandum of
Understanding with three of the twelve Canadian provincial securities
commissions, those in Ontario, Quebec, and British Columbia.8 2 The
mechanisms of this MOU are available for market oversight, investigation,
litigation, or prosecution. It makes available to its signatories information
in the agencies' files, as well as the receiving agency's assistance in taking
testimony and obtaining documents. 83 Although the signatories agree to
coordinate their efforts with one another, the MOU expressly recognizes
that each agency can obtain information directly from the other agencies'
jurisdiction by noncompulsory means without having to channel its re-
quest through the local regulatory authorities.
The MOU is triggered by a general description of the nature of a request,
and allows the use of information obtained by means of the MOU for a
variety of governmental and regulatory purposes related to the initial
request. Like the MOU with the United Kingdom, the Canadian MOU
provides for confidentiality and the ultimate return of all matters obtained
under the MOU to the extent permitted by law. 84
80. Memorandum of Understanding between the United States Securities and Exchange
Commission and the Securities Bureau of the Japanese Ministry of Finance on the Sharing
of Information (May 23, 1986); see 25 I.L.M. 1429 (1986).
81. Id.
82. Memorandum of Understanding between the United States Securities and Exchange
Commission and the Ontario Securities Commission, Commission des Valeurs Mobili res
du Quebec, and the British Columbia Securities Commission (Jan. 7, 1988). Securities traded
in Ontario account for 75 percent of the total value of stocks traded in Canada. SEC STAFF
REPORT, supra note 36, at 111-143. Quebec accounts for another 10 percent. Id. at 111-144.
83. To the extent that such evidence would be forthcoming on a voluntary basis, all the
signatories can currently meet this obligation. In addition, the Quebec Securities Commission
is authorized to employ compulsory measures to obtain evidence regarding violation of the
securities legislation of another legislative authority. Charter & Beck, Problems of Enforce-
ment in the Multinational Securities Market, 9 U. PA. J. INT'L.Bus. L. 467, 473 (1987). The
other signatories have agreed to make reasonable efforts to obtain the necessary authority
to use compulsory measures in aid of foreign investigations. See generally Goelzer, Rie-
senberg & Sullivan, supra note 61.
84. On September 24, 1985, the Ontario Securities Commission (OSC) and the Commis-
sion had previously agreed, in an exchange of letters, to assist each other in investigations
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d. Memorandum of Understanding between the
United States and Switzerland
On August 31, 1982, the Governments of the United States and Swit-
zerland signed a Memorandum of Understanding85 to establish "mutually
acceptable means" for dealing with certain insider trading problems that
were not susceptible of resolution under the Treaty on Mutual Assistance
in Criminal Matters between the United States and Switzerland. 86 The
Swiss MOU mandates the establishment of a provisional arrangement for
providing the Commission with assistance in insider trading inquiries in
the form of a separate private agreement among members of the Swiss
Bankers' Association (SBA). That agreement, known as Convention XVI,
provides that, under certain circumstances, banks may disclose infor-
mation to the Commission without violating the Swiss bank secrecy laws.87
On November 10, 1987, the United States and Switzerland exchanged
diplomatic notes premised upon the U.S.-Swiss Mutual Assistance Treaty
and on Switzerland's recent passage of legislation outlawing insider trad-
ing.88 Under the terms of the diplomatic exchange, the Securities and
and oversight of the U.S. and Toronto securities markets. The letters were exchanged in
anticipation of the electronic trading linkage of the American Stock Exchange and the
Toronto Stock Exchange. The OSC letter provided normal assurance that it was "extremely
unlikely" that the Canadian "blocking" statute would ever be invoked to prevent coop-
eration with a Commission investigation.
85. Memorandum of Understanding between the United States and Switzerland to Es-
tablish Acceptable Means for Improving International Law Enforcement Cooperation in the
Field of Insider Trading (Aug. 31, 1982); see 22 I.L.M. 1 (1983).
86. See supra discussion in text accompanying notes 64-66 and 72-74.
87. On August 7, 1986, the Commission settled the first case in which it had obtained
assistance pursuant to the 1982 Swiss MOU, SEC v. Harvey Katz, Civ. No. 86-6088 (S.D.N.Y.
4 g. 7, 1986). The Katz case involved allegations of insider trading in the securities of RCA
Corporation (RCA). The Commission alleged that Marcel Katz obtained material, nonpublic
information relating to a merger between RCA and General Electric Company (GE) in the
course of his employment as an analyst at Lazard Freres & Co. Marcel Katz, it was alleged,
subsequently disclosed this information to his father, Harvey Katz. The complaint further
alleged that Harvey Katz disclosed this information to his father-in-law, Elie Mordo, who
resided abroad, and to Fred Aizen, Katz's stockbroker. Finally, the stock was alleged to
have been purchased through a Swiss bank, the Union Bank of Switzerland. The Commission
used the 1982 Memorandum of Unde'standing between the United States and Switzerland
and Convention XVI of the Swiss Bankers' Association to identify defendant Mordo as the
purchaser of RCA common stock through the Geneva office of the Union Bank of Swit-
zerland. Pursuant to Convention XVI, the Commission's request was reviewed by the
Bankers' Association, the Swiss Federal Tribunal (Swiss Supreme Court), and the Swiss
Federal Council, all of whom affirmed the Commission's right to obtain the evidence sought.
During these deliberations, the profits that Mordo later disgorged in the U.S. civil action
were frozen pending a final resolution of the case in Switzerland. Altogether, the defendants
disgorged profits and paid penalties under the Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984, Pub.
L. No. 78-376, 98 Stat. 1264 (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.), of nearly $5.5
million.
88. Haymann, Swiss to Outlaw Insider Trading, INT'L FIN. L. REV., Oct. 1987, at 3; see
Swiss Approve Insider Bill, N.Y. Times, Dec. 17, 1987, at D6.
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Exchange Commission will be able to use treaty mechanisms directly to
obtain information from Switzerland for investigations into any potential
insider trading, or for litigation involving insider trading, without restric-
tion to instances where insiders engaged in tipping previously discussed. 89
When the Swiss legislation regarding insider trading becomes law during
1988, the earlier memorandum of understanding between the Commission
and the Swiss Government will lapse. 90
VI. Conclusion
It seems likely that the increasing integration of world securities mar-
kets, and the recent loss in the dollar's purchasing power relative to other
currencies, combined with the 30 percent decline in U.S. stock market
prices in late 1987, will produce more tender offers for U.S. securities by
foreign bidders in the coming year than the twenty-one in 1986. 9 1 In the
long run, increased international tender offers aimed at both U.S. and
foreign markets are an inevitable result of the increased international trade
in securities. The matters reviewed in this article-the scope of U.S. and
foreign jurisdiction, the adequacy of disclosure prepared in conformity
with differing norms, the assurance of compliance with U.S. or foreign
law-will be revisited in the contexts of these new tender offers. While
most countries regulate tender offers, 92 few countries combine strict dis-
closure requirements with minimal restrictions on transfers, as does the
U.S. This difference could give rise to significant conflicts in the regulation
of tender offers, which we have to date avoided. The challenge to the
United States, and to the world financial community, is to resolve those
conflicts in an efficient and effective fashion.
89. See supra note 58.
90. See supra note 61.
91. See The Resurgence of Takeovers, N.Y. Times, Feb. 6, 1988, at 33.
92. See SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note 36, ch. 111, p. V.
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